Introduction
In a recent article in this journal Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley argue that relational theories of art (most notably the institutional theory) are rooted in a misunderstanding of what it would take to falsify the family resemblance theories they are meant to supplant and, hence, are doomed to failure.
1 As they colourfully -year trip up 151). In this article, we argue that Neill and Ridley have made a number of errors in their arguments and, hence, may be guilty of sending some readers on an errant (but thankfully brief) trip of their own.
Before we discuss the arguments put forth by Neill and Ridley, we want to emphasize that it is no part of our aim in this article to argue for relationalism or institutionalism. Rather, our goal is more minimal to convince the reader that relationalists should not be seen as misunderstanding the falsification conditions of the family resemblance view and that such theories are not doomed to failure for the reasons offered by Neill and Ridley. Whether relationalism or institutionalism about art is correct is another matter entirely. 
Neill and Ridley against the Relational Theory
Neill and Ridley argue that relational theories are ultimately unsuccessful in providing a plausible alternative to the Wittgenstein-inspired family resemblance approach to the concept of art which Morris
Weitz argued for in his seminal paper. 2 Following Maurice Mandelbaum, relational theorists admit that W manifest (that is, nonrelational) properties, but claim that it is possible to define it by focusing on its relational properties.
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Neill and Ridley present their argument against this claim in three main parts.
First, they accuse the relational T identify relational properties which might -and-such is the family resemblance concept that it appears to be, merely to show the presence of some common feature. Rather, one must also and essentially show how that feature is responsible for the patterns of similarity to which the family 146 8 Some relationalists aim at making a claim about concepts; others are resolutely metaphysical in their aim.
Success by the latter might not falsify the family resemblance theory as characterized by Neill and Ridley.
a property shared by all works of art.
But should the relationalist be seen as centrally concerned with falsifying the family resemblance theory? Neill and Ridley seem to think so. We are sceptical. Like Kendall Walton, we think that a great deal of philosophical aesthetics can be seen as primarily concerned with the construction of theories;
9 Even when the falsification of competing theories is s pursued, this is often secondary to the main goal of theory building. Moreover, it is a mistake to construe a number of early relationalists as primarily aiming to falsify the family resemblance theory rather than as making the case for an alternative theory or criticizing the arguments offered in favour of the family None of these arguments are naturally seen as part of a project of falsifying the family resemblance theory.
Neill and Ridley are, however, onto something when they discuss a case in which there is some manifest feature which is common to all members of A M U
13 Just as an aesthetic theorist would not count as having offered even part of a successful theory if they declared that x could be a work of art only if x were self-identical, so too the relationalist would not count as having made any progress if they established that something is art only if it is not married to Socrates. Such propert M U -
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These are not the sort of properties that present a challenge to the family resemblance theorists, nor could they provide the basis of a successful aesthetic theory. The relationalist aims to tell us something interesting and substantive about artthis aim.
Why the Relationalist Need Not Satisfy the Explanatory Requirement
Must the relationalist show how the relati I this feature alone must be shown to be responsible for those patterns of similarity, we do not see why this is the case. Consider a concept C which appears, superficially, to be correctly captured by the family resemblance account but is, in fact, constituted by some relational feature R. British honours, almost all were academics, a couple were engineers, all were conventionally racialized as white and gendered as male in our culture. But, of course, anyone proposing a family resemblance theory of this category would be misguided, since the category is a paradigmatic example for which some sort of relational (perhaps institutional) theory is appropriate. Notice, however, that it is implausible that the relational feature that underwrites the unity of this category (having been approved by some University committee or something of the sort) is solely responsible for the relevant patterns of similarity that we find when examining the category. Rather, a full explanation will likely appeal to such factors as tradition and bias. Similarly, we suggest, there is no reason why the relationalist about art should be expected to show that the relational feature which putatively underwrites the unity of the category of art is also responsible on its own for the patterns of similarity to which the family resemblance theorist points. For just as in the case of vice-chancellors, there may be other contingent factors (for example, availability of raw materials, patterns of trade and colonization, religious traditions) which play a significant role in explaining those similarities.
Moreover, someone engaged in the project of providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a vice-chancellor of the University of Southampton would not be required to explain why most of them were awarded British honours. Similarly we see no reason to think that someone engaged in constructing a philosophical theory of art must address why the category of art exhibits various strands of similarity and resemblance -such a project might be an interesting one, but it is not a condition for an adequate theory of art. The explanatory requirement proposed by Neill and Ridley is, then, too strong.
Nevertheless, we think that Neill and Ridley are right that the relationalist must meet some sort of explanatory requirement. As argued above, relationalists would not succeed if they merely point to some trivial necessary condition for being a work of art (e.g., being self-identical). And this is because a successful relational theory needs to offer some explanation of why various things are art. Those trivial features cannot do this work. So there is a reasonable explanatory requirement on any adequate relational theory; however, this -we shall argue -is a requirement which the relationalist has no difficulty meeting.
How the Relationalist can Satisfy All Requirements
Contra Neill and Ridley, we think that relational theories can succeed in satisfying both the explanatory and openness requirements at the same time. First, we argue that this feat is fairly easy if we follow the 22 Gaut, A C C openness requirement. The robust explanatory requirement is satisfied by supplementing the institutional condition with specific reasons for status conferral which refer directly to a list of criteria already deemed highly relevant to determining why something is art by the resemblance theorists (142).
Since the good reasons for status conferral draw directly from the cluster of criteria which inform responsible for the patterns of similarity to which Neill and Ridley appeal. Similarities between artworks exist because they T F meet both the openness, and the strict version of the explanatory requirement. 
Conclusion

